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Abstract: The focus of this paper is on the system of aspectual coercion connected with 
durative adverbials (like for one day), time-span adverbials (like in ten minutes), and 
time-point adverbials (like at seven o’clock) as well as the progressive in English and 
its roots in the domain of eventualities. Aspectual coercions are regarded as operations 
which  are  executed  in  order  to  prevent  a  conflict  between  the  aspect  of  a  verbal 
expression and the aspectual requirements of the context. The meaning resulting from 
such an adjustment involves material which is not contributed by the constituents but 
originates from knowledge of eventualities. Thus, leading questions of the paper are 
what  the  overall  structure  of  eventualities  is  and  how  this  structure  determines  the 
aspectual meaning of expressions as well as the way in which it can be contextually 
shifted. Recurring to prior work in the field of research, several sorts of eventuality and 
general relations that exist between eventualities of different sorts are distinguished. On 
this basis, by examining a sample of data, the paper identifies a multitude of operations 
for systematically transforming the aspect (e.g. iterative coercion, habitual coercion, 
inchoative coercion, additive coercion, and subtractive coercion). Finally, taking into 
account that the operations have basically the same formal structure and, therefore, give 
reason to generalization, a two-stage approach to aspectual coercion is presented. Its 
most  notably  features  are  that,  first,  the  principle  of  semantic  compositionality  is 
entirely maintained in its validity and, second, adjusting by coercion is turned out to be 
ultimately a pragmatic phenomenon.   
 
 
1  Introduction 
   
This paper is concerned with the reference of expressions to different sorts of 
eventuality
1 and its systematic shifting in interpretation. The point of departure 
is  the  fact  that  understanding  an  utterance  often  involves  operations  which 
adjust the aspect
2 of a verb or one of its projections to requirements of the 
context. Usually, such an adjustment is called aspectual coercion.  
                                                 
*  I  am  especially  grateful  to  Markus  Egg,  Claudia  Maienborn  and  Chris  Piñón  for  helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Many thanks also to the participants of the Semantics 
Colloquium at the University of Leipzig for insightful discussion. 
1   The term eventuality introduced by Bach (1986) is understood here in the broadest sense, 
comprising events, processes, states, happenings, changes, episodes, etc. 
2   According to Smith (1991), we can distinguish beween two kinds of aspect of expressions – 
situation  aspect  (traditionally  called  also  aktionsart),  which  is  related  to  the  temporal 
constituency of the eventualities denoted by expressions, and viewpoint aspect (called also 
grammatical aspect), which is related to the temporal perspective from which the eventualities 
are presented by expressions. In the paper, I use the term aspect only in the first sense.  
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Often, aspectual coercion is required to prevent a mismatch between the 
aspect  of  a  verbal  expression  and  the  aspectual  constraint  of  its  adverbial 
modifier. For illustrating, look at sentence (1).  
 
(1)  #Fred played the sonata for one day. 
 
Here # marks that (1) is acceptable not in its literal but only in a non-literal 
reading which arises from an impending aspectual conflict within the sentence. 
On  the  one  hand,  according  to  its  usual  meaning  the  verb  phrase  play  the 
sonata denotes eventualities that are inherently bounded. On the other hand, 
the adverbial for a day indicates the duration of eventualities that do not have a 
natural end by themselves. Consequently, the VP does not satisfy the selection 
restriction  of  the  durative  adverbial  and,  hence,  cannot  be  modified  by  it, 
unless  the  VP  meaning  undergoes  a  suitable  adjustment  by  the  adverbial 
meaning. The preferred possibility is that the modifier coerces play the sonata 
into an iterative interpretation, meaning now consecutively playing a particular 
sonata.  As  a  result,  the  sentence  is  not  understood  as  referring  to  a  single 
playing of the sonata by Fred but to a sequence of eventualities of this kind, 
which has no inherent termination and lasts one day.  
Another durative adverbial with which the VP play the sonata in its literal 
meaning is not compatible shows up in sentence (2). 
 
(2)  #Fred played the sonata for one minute.
3  
 
For  obvious  reasons,  an  iterative  interpretation  is  not  appropriate  here. 
According to our experiential knowledge, it is very implausible that any sonata 
can be completely played in such a short time. Therefore, the VP is coerced 
into a reading – I will call it subtractive interpretation – in which it denotes 
eventualities  that are only part of playing a particular  sonata.  Accordingly, 
sentence (2) conveys that Fred was playing the sonata only for one minute and, 
therefore, without finishing it.    
However,  aspectual  coercion  needs  not  emerge  from  such  a  sentence-
internal source. It may also be motivated by the aim to reconcile a sentence 
with  world  knowledge.  For  instance,  in  (3),  the  VP  fulfills  the  selection 
restriction of the durative adverbial insofar as it literally denotes eventualities 
of playing a certain piano without an inherent termination. 
    
                                                 
3  I underline that # does not mean that the respective sentence is unacceptable in general. Instead 
the symbol indicates that it can be accepted only if it is reinterpreted or, more precisely, if it is 
interpreted in a non-literal sense.  In the cases considered here this is done by adapting the 
aspectual meaning.  
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(3)  #Fred played the piano for one year. 
 
But the literal reading of the sentence is incompatible with our experiential 
knowledge about the physical abilities of human being and, therefore, odd. 
Due to the fact that nobody can play a piano for one year without pause play 
the piano is coerced into a habitual interpretation. Consequently, sentence (3) 
is taken as referring to Fred’s one-year lasting practice or habit to play the 
piano at times.                 
Speaking generally, aspectual coercion is destined to avoid a conflict with 
linguistic  or  non-linguistic  context  by  shifting  the  aspect  and,  thus,  the 
meaning of a verbal expression. Importantly, the resulting meaning contains 
material  over  and  above  that  which  is  immediately  contributed  by  the 
expression by itself. For instance, in (1), the notion of iteration that is part of 
the understanding of play the sonata is not introduced via the original meaning 
of the VP but by means of enriching it with elements of world knowledge. 
Thus,  unlike  other  operations  on  meaning,  an  adjustment  of  aspect  is  a 
syntactically and morphologically invisible operation, i.e. it does not have any 
counterpart in linguistic form. 
At  present,  there  are  a  number  of  proposals  for  explaining  aspectual 
coercion. Moens and Steedman (1988) were the first to discuss the ubiquitous 
phenomenon as a topic of its own. In particular, they formulate a network of  
possible shiftings along with a characterization of the aspect of expressions 
involved. Further, Pulman (1997) offers a formal description that is based on 
Moens and Steedman’s account and specifies it in many respects. Up to now, 
the most substantial contribution to the analysis of aspectual coercion, being 
part of a more general approach to contextual variation in meaning, is made by 
Egg (2005). A great deal of actual research, however, suffers  from several 
limitations  or  shortcomings.  For  example,  Pustejovsky  (1995),  Jackendoff 
(1997), de Swart (1998) and Rothstein (2004) assume that aspectual coercion 
is always triggered by a mismatch between two expressions that have to be 
composed.  Thus,  the  treatments  are  too  restrictive  since  they  preclude 
sentence-external sources of  adjustment. Further, the authors claim that the 
aspectual  conflict  gives  rise  to  insert  a  particular  semantic  operator  which 
immediately  resolves  it,  i.e.  aspectual  coercion  is  basically  considered  a 
semantic operation. Moreover, due to the insertion of additional material of 
meaning, some researchers explicitly draw the conclusion that the enrichments 
force to restrict or even to cancel the principle of semantic compositionality. 
For  instance,  according  to  Jackendoff  (1997),  syntactically  transparent 
combination of meaning should be viewed merely as a default in a wider range 
of so-called enriched semantic composition.
4     
                                                 
4   For  a  detailed  review  and  evaluation  of  the  proposals  made  by  Moens  and  Steedman,  
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In  Dölling  (2003a,  2003b,  2005a),  I  argue  for  an  approach  which  is 
basically in accordance with the strategy adopted by Pulman (1997) and Egg 
(2005).  Most  notably,  supposing  that  linguistically  determined  meaning  is 
strongly underspecified, adjustments of aspect are regarded as context-driven 
enrichments which are carried out in the course of interpretation and have no 
impact on semantic compositionality. But, with respect to the concrete content 
of  coercion,  my  account  differs  from  the  proposals  of  the  authors.  More 
precisely,  it  is  distinguished  by  two  characteristics:  First,  the  multitude  of 
possible aspectual coercions that appear to be partly quite diverse emerge as 
instances of the same kind of formal structure. Second, their systematic nature 
is predicated on relations that exist between the sorts of eventualities which are 
associated with the situation described by the respective sentence.    
It is evident that the structure of eventualities underlying verbal meaning 
plays an essential role in determining the aspect of expressions and the way in 
which  it  can  be  contextually  shifted.  Properties  of  eventualities  such  as 
duration  or  dynamicity  permit  to  classify  the  eventualities  and,  thus,  the 
expressions denoting them. Moreover, general relations between eventualities 
indicate what kind of meaning arises if the aspect of an expression is coerced. 
Unfortunately,  however,  there  are  still  many  desiderata  in  analyzing 
eventuality structure in general and in its role as basis of aspectual coercion in 
particular. For this reason, leading questions of my paper are what the overall 
structure of eventualities is and how this structure is reflected in the meaning 
of verbal expressions. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives some insights 
into the structure of eventualities and the way aspectual classification is based 
on it. In particular, two types of eventuality structure – sortal and intersortal 
structure – are distinguished. Taking the ontological distinctions expressed in 
natural language seriously, I advocate a classification of eventualities which is 
richer than commonly assumed and formulate a number of postulates linking 
them. Section 3 examines a sample of data and, at first, delivers a preliminary 
analysis  of  aspectual  coercion.  As  a  result,  a  multitude  of  operations  are 
identified,  which  allow  to  shift  the  aspect  and,  with  it,  the  meaning  of 
expressions in order to meet the requirements of context. In view of the fact 
that the operations are similar in a way and, thus, give reason to generalization, 
then  I  present  a  two-stage  approach  that  explains  aspectual  coercion  by 
systematically  integrating  underspecified  semantic  structure  of  expressions 
with  knowledge  of  eventuality  structure  and,  thus,  demonstrates  it  to  be 
ultimately a pragmatic phenomenon.  
 
                                                                                                           
Pustejovsky, Pulman as well as de Swart see Egg (2005). Cf. also Dölling (2003a).  
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2  A Survey of Eventuality Structure 
 
2.1 Aspectuality and eventuality structure 
 
Investigation  into  eventuality  structure  occupies  an  increasing  realm  of 
semantic  research.  One  of  the  prominent  phenomena  that  advance  this 
development  is  aspectuality.  According  to  Vendler  (1957),  aspectual 
classification characterizes verbs and their projections by tests that check the 
compatibility of the expressions with specific linguistic environments. Some of 
the most important properties of the four aspects – called accomplishments, 
achievements,  activities  and  statives
5  –  which  verbal  expressions  are 
standardly divided into can be summarized as follows.  
First, accomplishments like write a poem, compose the sonata, run to the 
summit or drink a glass of beer are compatible with time-span adverbials and 
the  progressive  in  their  literal  meaning  but  with  durative  or  time-point 
adverbials only on condition of non-literal interpretation. 
 
(4)  (a)  Rob wrote a poem in three hours. 
(b)  Rob was composing the sonata. 
(c)  #Rob run to the summit for thirty minutes. 
(d)  #Rob drunk a glass of beer at seven o’clock sharp. 
 
Second, achievements like win, arrive, die or reach the summit are compatible 
with  time-point  adverbials  in  their  literal  meaning  but  with  time-span 
adverbials, the progressive or durative adverbials only on condition of non-
literal interpretation.  
 
(5)  (a)  #Ann arrived in three hours. 
(b)  #Ann was reaching the summit. 
(c)  #Ann won for thirty minutes. 
(d)  Ann died at seven o’clock sharp. 
 
Third,  activities  like  run,  play  the  piano,  write  poems  or  drink  beer  are 
compatible  with  the  progressive  and  durative  adverbials  in  their  literal 
meaning but with time-span or time-point adverbials only on condition of non-
literal interpretation.  
 
(6)  (a)  #Bob played the piano in three hours. 
                                                 
5   In order to draw a clear terminological distinction between the ontological and the linguistic 
point of view, I do not use state but stative for denoting the respective aspect.   
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(b)  Bob was writing poems. 
(c)  Bob drunk beer for thirty minutes.  
(d)  #Bob run at seven o’clock sharp. 
 
Fourth, statives like own, be silly, be drunk or be at the summit are compatible 
with durative or time-point adverbials in their literal meaning but with time-
span  adverbials  or  the  progressive  only  on  condition  of  non-literal 
interpretation. 
 
(7)  (a)  #Sue owned the car in three hours. 
(b)  #Sue was being silly. 
(c)  Sue was at the summit for thirty minutes. 
(d)  Sue was drunk at seven o’clock sharp. 
  
There are several questions which the linguistic tests raise. In particular, more 
detailed investigation indicates that Vendler’s classification is not fine-grained 
enough to cover all aspectual differences between verbal predicates. For this 
reason, researchers have continuously aimed at an improvement of this kind of 
differentiation  as  well  as  an  clarification  of  the  factors  underlying  it. 
Importantly, Dowty (1979) tried to capture aspectual distinctions by means of 
lexical decomposition within the framework of classical Montague semantics. 
But as Moens and Steedman (1988), Pustejovsky (1991), Krifka (1992), Egg 
(1995),  Piñón  (1995),  Pulman  (1997),  Engelberg  (2004)  and  others  have 
demonstrated,  the  proposal  is  not  satisfactory  for  giving  a  conclusive 
foundation to aspectuality in all. Most notably, Dowty does not really entered 
into an ontological commitment to eventualities and their structure. 
Only after the introduction of the eventuality-based semantics in the eighties 
of the last century, initiated in particular by Parsons (1990) and originating 
from Davidson’s (1967) idea to provide verbs with an event argument position, 
eventualities were acknowledged as entities in their own right and as revealing 
a structure of their own (cf. Maienborn 2010). In the meantime, researchers 
have developed various linguistically motivated accounts of the ontology
6 of 
eventualities, i.e. of what fundamental properties eventualities have, what basic 
sorts  of  them  are  there,  and  how  these  sorts  are  related  to  each  other. 
Accordingly,  at  least  three  kinds  of  structure  determining  the  domain  of 
eventualities  can  be  distinguished:  the  mereological,  the  sortal,  and  the 
                                                 
6   It should be noted that the ontology interested in here results from projecting our common 
conceptual framework onto environmental input. Thus, by their nature the respective analyses 
are not primarily concerned with the way the world ‘really' is but rather with the way human 
beings conceptualize it for the purpose of ordinary thinking and speaking.    
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intersortal structure. Each of them makes a contribution to the whole called 
eventuality structure.  
Probably, the most influential consideration to the issue is to suppose that 
eventualities  are  internally  structured  in  the  sense  that  they  have 
subeventualities, i.e. other eventualities as their parts. Following Link’s (1983) 
crucial innovation to assume a specific mereological (or algebraic) structure on 
the domain of objects, Bach (1986) and, especially, Krifka (1992, 1998) have 
extended  the  approach  to  the  domain  of  eventualities.  For  lack  of  space, 
however, I cannot go into this structure here. Rather, I will confine myself to 
outline the basic ideas of sortal and intersortal structure of eventualities and to 
mention some of the constraints that need to be imposed.  
 
2.2 Sortal structure of eventualities 
 
The sortal structure of eventualities is a hierarchy generated by the subsort 
relation between sets of eventualities. How many sorts of eventuality should be 
exactly distinguished is a matter of ongoing debate. However, all authors who 
try  to  improve  aspectual  classification  by  relating  it  to  an  ontological 
fundament separate eventualities into at least two subsorts: events in a broad 
sense  –  I  will  adopt  the  term  occurrence  for  them  –  ,  which  display 
dynamicity, and states, which do not. What both sorts of eventuality have in 
common, however, is that their members take a time longer than an instant. 
While  the  former  are  generally  taken  to  be  particular  spatio-temporal 
entities with participants, opinons differ over the precise ontological status of 
the latter. A point at issue is whether states should be actually treated as fully-
fledged  particulars  or  not.
7  Regardless  of  such  differences,  all  researchers 
agree that sentences describing states have the strict subinterval property (cf. 
e.g. Dowty 1979). That is, if a state description is true of a time intervall, it is 
also  true  of  all  parts  of  the  intervall.  Thus,  an  ontological  assumption 
suggesting itself is that states hold at every instant during their time period. 
This  property  singles  out  states  from  all  other  eventualities.  Moreover,  it 
explains why sentences like (7d) are acceptable without restriction.  
Most  authors  (see  e.g.  Mourelatos  1978,  Bach  1986,  Parsons  1990, 
Pustejovsky 1991, Piñón 1995, Pulman 1997, de Swart 1998, Rothstein 2004) 
divide  occurrences,  i.e.  dynamic  eventualities  into  two  further  sorts  – 
processes and events (in the narrow sense). The division is seen in correlation 
with the aspectual separation of activities and accomplishments.  
                                                 
7   For a discussion of some problems and a specific proposal to solve them, see Maienborn 
(2005) and Dölling (2005b).   
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Intuitively,  events  are  telic  occurrences,  i.e.  movements  towards  a  set 
terminal point − their culmination. For instance, in (8), it is not simply the 
case that the event referred to, i.e. the drinking of a glass of beer is finished. 
 
(8)  John drank a glass of beer.  
 
Instead, its inherent goal has been attained by consuming the whole glass of 
beer.  By  contrast,  processes  are  atelic  occurrences,  i.e.  such  that  do  not 
determine an inherent termination of their moving but simply stop at some 
arbitrary temporal point. For instance, the process referred to by (9) is also 
brought to an end. 
 
(9)  John drank beer. 
   
But the course of drinking might well have continued, i.e. John might have 
drunk more and more beer.  
The difference between the two sorts is the reason why, on the one hand, 
event predicates are compatible without difficulty with time-span adverbials 
(cf. (4a)), but normally not with durative adverbials (cf. (4c)) and, on the other 
hand, process predicates, in analogy to state predicates (cf. (7c) vs. (7a)), are 
compatible without difficulty with durative adverbials (cf. (6c)), but normally 
not with time-span adverbials (cf. (6a)).  
There is an ongoing discussion on the question of whether an ontological 
distinction between events and processes is necessary or, more importantly, 
even admissible. As one and the same situation of drinking a glass of beer can 
be described as falling both in the extension of the VP drink a glass of beer 
and  in  that  of  the  VP  drink  beer,  Krifka  (1992,  1998)  argues  that  the 
differentiation  in  question  is  not  a  matter  of  ontology  but  only  one  of 
description.  Therefore,  the  telic/atelic  distinction  should  not  be  applied  to 
eventualities  but  to  eventuality  predicates.  In  the  end,  Krifka  suggests  that 
telicity and atelicity can be reconstructed in terms of mereology alone.  
For  my  point  of  view,  to  say  that  mereological  properties  represent 
important features of verbal expressions is one thing; to say that they make it 
dispensable to separate events and processes is quite another.
8 By contrast, like 
Piñón (1995), I assume that a situation such as drinking a glass of beer can be 
conceptualized  as  two  distinct  eventualities,  namely  as  one  falling  in  the 
denotation of the event predicate drink a glass of beer and one falling in the 
denotation of the process predicate drink beer. As I will specify in the next 
                                                 
8   Interestingly,  although  Filip  (1999)  and  Rothstein  (2004,  2008)  basically  adopt  Krifka’s 
attitude towards the telic/atelic distinction, they distinguish also between events and processes.   
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section, if processes are viewed as being the ‘stuff’ events are made of, then 
the distinction between the two subsorts of occurrences is very natural. 
Commonly  (v.a.  Dowty  1979,  also  e.g.  Moens  and  Steedman  1988, 
Pustejovsky 1991, Piñón 1995, but not Vendler 1957), events are identified 
with changes of state, i.e. eventualities arising from a state and resulting in an 
opposite one. As noted by Egg (1995), however, a closer inspection shows that 
this assumption is not correct. Of course, VPs like drink a glass of beer, run to 
the summit, write a poem or compose a sonata are predicates of events that 
deserve to be called changes. So the event referred to by sentence (10) is a 
transition from a state of Sam’s not being at the summit to a state of his being 
at the summit and, thus, a change.  
 
(10)  Sam ran to the summit. 
 
VPs like run a mile, recite a poem or play a sonata, being usually counted 
among accomplishments too, denote also properties of events. But, in moving 
to an inherent goal, the respective events do not involve any alternation of state 
and, therefore, do not bring about a new state.
9 For instance, no state has been 
replaced by its opposite state by running a mile by Sam.      
 
(11)  Sam ran a mile. 
 
Accordingly, sentence (11) does not refer to a change, but still to an event. I 
will dub events that are no changes episodes.   
As two subsorts of event – changes and episodes – have to be distinguished, 
the question arises whether the term accomplishment should be still used in the 
broad  sense.  Egg  (1995,  2005)  observes  that  the  ontological  difference  is 
reflected in an aspectual one. While a VP like run to the summit is compatible 
with the perfect in its literal meaning, an expression like run a mile is it only 
on condition of non-literal interpretation. 
 
(12)  (a)  Sam has run to the summit. 
  (b)  #Sam has run a mile. 
   
Hence, it seems to be reasonable to restrict the class of accomplishments to 
predicates denoting properties of change. Following a proposal by Egg (1995), 
verbal  expressions  denoting  properties  of  episodes  can  be  called 
intergressives. 
                                                 
9   Here I understand the term state in the sense of what Parsons (1990) calls target state. It is 
important not to identify this kind of state with states which Parsons calls resultant states.   
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Another sort accepted by many authors is that of eventualities which occur 
in the denotations of achievements like win or reach the summit. Mostly, such 
eventualities are regarded as being telic and, at the same time, instantaneous 
(see e.g. Mourelatos 1978, Bach 1986, Pustejovsky 1991, Pulman 1997, de 
Swart 1998, Rothstein 2004, Egg 2005). In particular, a typical assumption is 
that they constitute a subsort of events, namely immediate changes of state. As 
a consequence, they are often considered to coincide with culminations (see 
e.g. Moens & Steedman 1988, Kamp & Reyle 1993). However, because events 
always require a time longer than an instant to move to their inherent goal the 
account cannot be adequate.
10  
Instead  of  that,  I  argue  for  a  specific  sort  of  eventualities  that  have  no 
internal temporal structure. Thus, although located in time, they do not take 
any  time,  i.e.  they  are  strictly  instantaneous.  Obviously,  such  eventualities 
must be separated from states as well as occurrences, which essentially have a 
duration.  Following  a  proposal  by  Piñón  (1997),  I  will  call  the  former 
boundaries and the latter happenings. In the next section, the relation between 
the two sorts of eventuality will be characterized a little bit more.    
It  appears  that  most  of  Vendler’s  achievements  denote  properties  of 
boundaries.  So  the  sentence  in  (13)  refers  to  the  end  point  and,  hence,  a 
boundary of Sam’s moving to a certain summit.  
 
(13)  Sam reached the summit. 
 
Accordingly, the VP reach the summit is a predicate applicable to this kind of 
boundary. In analogy, an expression like leave the summit, which occures in 
(14), can be used to refer to the initial point of a moving away from a summit.  
 
(14)  Sam left the summit. 
 
Thus, the VP denotes also a particular property of boundaries.
11 The feature of 
punctuality displayed by boundaries is responsible for, on the one hand, the 
problem-free  compatibility  of  achievements  with  time-point  adverbials  (cf. 
(5d)) and, on the other hand, the merely restricted compatibility with time-span 
and durative adverbials as well as the progressive, as indicated by sentences 
(5a) – (5c).         
                                                 
10   In particular, I doubt that Rothstein (2004, 2008) is right in assuming that the eventualities in 
the  denotation  of  achievements,  being  temporally  not  extented,  consist  of  two  temporally 
adjacent instants.  
11   Since achievements differ in that they are related to end or initial points, it is considerable to 
discriminate between two sorts of boundary – right boundaries and left boundaries. Moreover, 
in accordance with this idea of Piñón (1997), Heyde-Zybatow (2008) offers an analysis which 
makes an explicit distinction between right boundary and left boundary achievements.   
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Following Vendler (1957), in the past verbs like sneeze, flash, cough, kick 
or jump were often classified as achievements, too. But now, the assumption is 
common that they constitute a separate aspectual class – called semelfactives 
(cf.  Smith  1991).  At  a  first  glance,  semelfactives  seem  to  have  the  same 
aspectual properties as achievements.   
 
(15)  (a)  #Mary sneezed in three hours. 
  (b)  #Mary was coughing. 
  (c)  #Mary jumped for thirty minutes. 
  (d)  Mary kicked at seven o’clock sharp. 
 
Later I will show that the two classes are different in regard to the aspect shifts 
they allow for.  
Importantly, I assume that the denotations of semelfactives are made up by 
eventualities  called  moments.  As  they  are  premised  to  be  durationless, 
moments constitute together with boundaries a sort of eventualities for which I 
will  adopt  the  term  point.  Unlike  boundaries,  however,  they  are  not 
intrinsically instantaneous but only conceptualized as being instantaneous for 
the purpose of ordinary thinking.
12 More precisely,  moments can be traced 
back to eventualities which have an internal structure and, thereby, take time. 
For instance, for an actual sneezing to occur, several things have to happen at 
different instants. By their nature, the underlying eventualities are dynamic and 
even  telic  but  do  not  involve  alternations  of  state,  i.e.  they  are  particular 
episodes.  Since  under  normal  condition  the  temporal  extension  of  such 
eventualities is more or less short and, therefore, marginal in comparison with 
that of most other everyday things, their duration remains out of consideration.  
Finally,  there  are  also  some  proposals  to  split  up  states  into  sorts.  For 
instance, Moens & Steedman (1988) draw a distinction between consequent, 
progressive, lexical and habitual states. Here, I suggest a provisional division 
in two sorts: episodic states, which are autonomous or self-supporting in a 
way,  and  habitual  states,  which,  roughly,  represent  a  habit,  disposition  or 
ability ‘to do something’ and, in this sense, are nonautonomous.  
For illustrating, look at the sentences in (16).   
 
(16)  (a)  John was drunk. 
  (b)  John used to drink. 
  (c)  John was a drinker. 
 
                                                 
12   Moens and Steedman (1988) were the first noting the specific of this kind of eventuality. Cf. 
also Rothstein (2008). 
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While (16a) refers to an episodic state of John’s being drunk, (16b) and (16c) 
refer to the habitual state of John’s drinking alcohol regularly. Accordingly, I 
assume that the denotation of verbal expressions like be drunk is made up of 
members of the first sort and the denotation of expressions like use to drink or 
be a drinker is constituted by such of the second one. More linguistic data 
supporting the separation of habitual from episodic states will be presented 
later on. 
To  sum  up,  it  seems  appropriate  to  allow  for  a  sortal  structure  of 
eventualities  which  is  richer  than  commonly  supposed.  Particularly,  further 
differentiations  need  to  be  made  for  characterizing  properties  of  verbal 
predicates, which go beyond the traditional aspectual classification.  
In figure 1, I illustrate the ontological taxonomy argued for in this section 
along with the most important features of some sorts of eventuality as well as a 
number of examples of verbal expressions that are predicable of eventualities 
of the respective sort.  
 
                  eventualities 
                                                                    
     
      points                   happenings   
        (non-durative)                    (durative)   
 
 
boundaries      moments           states                  occurrences 
 (intrinsically   (not intrinsically   (non-dynamic)         (dynamic) 
    instantaneous)    instantaneous) 
 
                  habitual     episodic        processes         events 
                    states                states         (atelic)         (telic) 
           (nonautonomous) (autonomous)     
                                   
                         episodes           changes 
                  (non-resultative)   (resultative) 
 
win, reach     sneeze,           use to drink,    be drunk, be at   run, drink     run a             run to the 
the summit,     flash, hop,     be a drinker,    the summit,        beer, play     mile, play      summit, drink 
die, leave    kick, cough     be silly            be drinking         the piano      the sonata     a glass of beer 
                                                          
Figure 1 
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In  accordance  with  the  sortal  structure,  I  assume  twelve  predicates  which 
denote sorts of eventuality and, at the same time, indicate the corresponding 
aspects  of  verbal  expression.  Their  interdependence  is  represented  by  the 
postulates in (17), where e is a variable of eventualities and : is the exclusive 
disjunction. 
 
(17)  (a)  ∀e [EVENTUALITY(e)  ↔  POINT(e)  :  HAPPENING(e)] 
  (b)  ∀e [POINT(e)  ↔  BOUNDARY(e)  :  MOMEMT(e)] 
  (c)  ∀e [HAPPENING(e)  ↔  STATE(e)  :  OCCURRENCE(e)]  
  (d)  ∀e [STATE(e)  ↔  HABITUAL_STATE(e)  :  EPISODIC_STATE(e)]   
  (e)  ∀e [OCCURRENCE(e)  ↔  PROCESS(e)  :  EVENT(e)] 
  (f)  ∀e [EVENT(e)  ↔  EPISODE(e)  :  CHANGE(e)] 
 
Needless to say, further predicates discriminating between sorts of eventuality 
are imaginable.    
   
2.3 Intersortal structure of eventualities 
 
Unlike  the  hierarchical  structure  considered  before,  the  intersortal  structure 
imposed on the domain of eventualities is formed by various general relations 
which  connect  members  of  different  sorts.  There  are  several  proposals  to 
explore the intersortal relations, and  many of the approaches offered differ 
from each other in a basic manner. As not any of them can be discussed in 
detail  here,  I  restrict  myself  to  a  few  points  which  are  important  for  my 
purpose. 
According to Piñón (1997), all (finite) happinings have two boundaries –  
their beginning and their ending. I assume that the two relations the beginning 
of and the ending of, which are represented by the predicates BEG and END, 
respectively, are characterized by the following  postulates:   
 
(18)  (a)  ∀e [HAPPENING(e)  →  ∃e’∃e’’[BEG(e’, e)  ∧  END(e’’, e)]] 
  (b)  ∀e∀e’[BEG(e, e’)  ∨  END(e, e’)  →  BOUNDARY(e)  ∧  HAPPENING(e’)]  
  (c)  ∀e [BOUNDARY(e)  →  ∃e’[BEG(e, e’)  ∨  END(e, e’)]] 
 
In addition, beginnings and  endings differ as  follows: If a boundary is the 
beginning (ending) of a happening, then the happening stretches temporally to 
the  right  (left).  Thus,  for  instance,  if  Paul  begins  (ends)  to  move,  then  he 
moves for a while immediately thereafter (before). 
Further, Moens and Steedman (1988) as well as Kamp and Reyle (1993) 
suggest  that  an  event  is  complex  in  the  sense  that  it  is  composed  of  a  
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preparatory process and a culmination.
13 Therefore, to borrow a term  from 
Moens and Steedman, events are often viewed as culminated processes. By 
contrast, elaborating on an idea by Bach (1986), Piñón (1995) argues that the 
event and the process it is made of – its substratum – are spatio-temporally 
superposed though not identical. While the event has the same boundaries as 
the process, the former differs from the latter in that the ending is inherent in it. 
Thus, the end point can be viewed as the culmination which the event aspires 
to.  
Building on these observations, I suppose the postulates in (19) and (20), 
where SUBST and CULM are predicates of the substratum relation and the 
culmination relation, respectively.  
 
(19)  (a)  ∀e [EVENT(e)  →  ∃e’[SUBST(e’, e)]] 
  (b)  ∀e∀e’[SUBST(e, e’)  →  PROCESS(e)  ∧  EVENT(e’)  ∧  ∃e’’[BEG(e’’, e)   
    ∧  BEG(e’’, e’)]  ∧  ∃e’’[END(e’’, e)  ∧  END(e’’, e’)]] 
 
(20)  (a)  ∀e [EVENT(e)  →  ∃e’[CULM(e’, e)]] 
  (b)  ∀e∀e’[CULM(e, e’)  →  EVENT(e’)  ∧  END(e, e’)] 
   
Moreover, processes being the substratum of an event have proper parts which 
are processes of the same kind and, therefore, contribute to the constitution of 
the event. The postulates in (21) determine that the event can be viewed as the 
completion – denoted by the relation predicate COMPL – of the respective 
processes.
14  
 
(21)  (a)  ∀e [EVENT(e)  →  ∃e’[COMPL(e, e’)]] 
  (b)  ∀e∀e’[COMPL(e, e’)  →  EVENT(e)  ∧  PROCESS(e’)  ∧  ∃e’’[SUBST(e’’, e)   
    ∧  e’ < e’’]] 
 
Next,  taking  into  account  that  not  all  events,  but  only  changes  create  a 
poststate, I assume the following postulates, where RES is a predicate standing 
for the relation the result of between states and changes.      
 
(22)  (a)  ∀e [CHANGE(e)  →  ∃e’[RES(e’, e)]] 
  (b)  ∀e∀e’[RES(e, e’)  →  STATE(e)  ∧  CHANGE(e’)  ∧  ∃e’’[BEG(e’’, e)  
    ∧  END(e’’, e’)]] 
                                                 
13   As opposed to it, Pulman (1997) claims that events are made up of processes and states. For 
my point of view, this assumption is not justifiable.     
14   It is obvious that the concept of events as process completion, supposed in (21), is too simple 
and, hence, must be improved. In particular, considering the intensional character of the issue, 
a distinction between possible and real events has to be drawn.     
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Accordingly, if Paul moves to the summit, then there is a state of Paul’s being 
at the summit, which is the result of the motion event. The ending of Paul’s 
moving  to  the  summit  is  at  the  same  time  the  beginning  of  the  state.  In 
addition, changes fulfill the following condition: The ending of a change is at 
the  same  time  the  ending  of  the  state  that  is  complementary  to  the  state 
resulting from the change. For instance, if Paul ends moving to the summit, 
then the state in which he is not at the summit ends too. 
Turning  now  to  moments,  I  assume  that  they  are  in  relationsship  with 
episodes which have a more or less short temporal extension and, therefore, 
can serve as the basis for a moment. As explained in the last section, for the 
purpose of ordinary thinking the respective episodes are conceptually reduced 
to  moments,  i.e.  eventualities  that  are  presumed  to  have  no  duration.  The 
postulates in (23), where RED denotes the relation the reduction of between 
moments and episodes, reflect this circumstance.      
 
(23)  (a)  ∀e [MOMENT(e)  →  ∃e’[RED(e, e’)]] 
  (b)  ∀e∀e’[RED(e, e’)  →  MOMENT(e)  ∧  EPISODE(e’)] 
 
For  instance,  a  moment  of  sneezing  by  Mary  has  to  be  decoded  as  the 
reduction  of  an  episode  in  which  Mary  does  things  like  open  the  mouth, 
breathe in, close the eyes and breathe out.      
The most perspicuous conception of processes is that they are built up from 
events (cf. e.g. Parsons 1990, Piñón 1995, Rothstein 2004). In accordance with 
it,  I  assume  that  processes  are  constituted  by  an  unspecific  number  of 
temporally adjacent events. Using CONST and TEMP_ADJ for the relations 
constituent of and temporally adjacent to, respectively, I postulate that for 
each  process  there  are  at  least  two  temporally  adjacent  events  that  are 
constituents of it.             
 
(24)  (a)  ∀e [PROC(e)  →  ∃e’∃e’’[CONST(e’, e)  ∧  CONST(e’’, e)  ∧  TEMP_ADJ(e’, e’’)]] 
  (b)  ∀e∀e’[CONST(e, e’)  →  EVENT(e)  ∧  PROCESS(e’)] 
   
For example, a process of drinking beer is a sequence of events in which a 
specific quantity of beer is drunk. Thus, if John drank a glass of beer from 
19.00 to 20.00 and he drank a glass of beer again from 20.00 to 21.00, then he 
drank beer from 19.00 to 21.00. 
Finally, I adopt the position that a habitual state is an eventuality which has 
to be realized by means of an unspecific number of temporally not adjacent 
occurrences  of  certain  kind.  For  my  purpose,  it  will  suffice  to  assume  the  
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postulates  in  (25),  where  REAL  is  the  predicate  of  realization  between 
occurrences and habitual states. 
 
(25)  (a)  ∀e [HABITUAL_STATE(e)  →  ∃e’∃e’’[REAL(e’, e)  ∧  REAL(e’’, e)   
    ∧  ¬TEMP_ADJ(e’, e’’)]]  
  (b)  ∀e∀e’ [REAL(e, e’)  →  OCCURRENCE(e)  ∧  HABITUAL_STATE(e’)]   
 
As indicated, a habitual state requires the existence of at least two occurrences 
that are realizations of it. For instance, a state such that John has the habit to 
drink beer exists only due to it that there are several processes of drinking of 
beer by John, which take place within a sufficiently large interval.   
In figure 2, I give a concluding overview of the general relations between 
members of different sorts of eventuality.  
 
                  eventualities 
                                                                    
     
      points                    happenings   
 
 
boundaries      moments          states                  occurrences 
 
 
                  habitual     episodic        processes         events 
                     states                states 
                                   
             the beginning / ending of                            episodes            changes 
 
                                                       constituent of 
                                                          
                                                  the substratum of 
 
                           the completion of 
                             
                the result of 
 
               realization of 
 
                 the reduction of 
 
        the culmination of  
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Figure 2 
  
To be sure, my survey of the ontology of eventualities is provisional in many 
respects and, hence, needs a good deal of specification. With it, however, I 
dispose of a sufficient basis to address the way in which eventuality structure 
is systematically reflected in aspectual coercion.  
 
 
3  A System of Aspectual Coercion 
 
3.1 Coercion by durative adverbials 
 
Before examining several kinds of aspectual coercion in more detail, a few 
comments are in order with respect to the general mode of representation of 
meaning.  I  adopt  a  neo-Davidsonian  format  of  verbal  meaning,  which  is 
particularly developed by Parsons (1990), Krifka (1992) and Kratzer (1996). 
On this view, verbs are separated from their thematic arguments and uniformly 
treated as predicates ranging over eventualities. The arguments are introduced 
via predicates such as AG (the agent of), TH (the theme of), HD (the holder 
of), etc., which denote relations between eventualities and their participants. 
Further, I assume that the inherent aspect of a verbal expression is lexically 
determined  if  the  expression  is  a  verb,  and  it  is  determined  by  aspectual 
composition if the expression is one of the projections of a verb.
15 Thus, for 
instance, the verb play is a predicate of processes and the VPs play the piano 
and play the sonata, resulting from the combination of play with the NPs the 
piano and the sonata, respectively, are a predicate of processes and a predicate 
of  episodes,  respectively.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  I  assume  that  verbal 
expressions are aspectually classified on the basis of sortal restrictions like 
(26).  
 
(26)  (a)  ∀e [sneeze(e)  →  MOMENT(e)] 
  (b)  ∀e [win(e)  →  BOUNDARY(e)] 
  (c)  ∀e [win(e)  ∧  TH(the_game, e)  →  BOUNDARY(e)]   
  (d)  ∀e [play(e)  ∧  TH(the_piano, e)  →  PROCESS(e)] 
  (e)  ∀e [play(e)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e)  →  EPISODE(e)] 
  (f)  ∀e [run(e)  →  PROCESS(e)] 
  (g)  ∀e [run(e)  ∧  to(e, the_summit)  →  CHANGE(e)] 
                                                 
15   Aspectual  composition  basically  obeys  the  principles  formulated  in  Krifka’s  mereological 
theory (cf. Krifka 1992, 1998). Some adaptations of the theory, which are necessary in order to 
meet the conditions of the approach pursued here, remain the task of future work.  
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  (h)  ∀e [reach(e)  ∧  TH(the_summit, e)  →  BOUNDARY(e)] 
  (i)  ∀e [be_at_the_summit(e)  →  STATE(e)] 
 
In addition, the fact that some adverbial modifiers can be only combined with 
verbal expressions of a certain aspect is also captured by sortal restrictions. For 
instance, as the application of durative adverbials like for one day is restricted 
to predicates of states or processes, the following postulate is supposed:       
 
(27)  ∀e∀t [for(e, t)  →  TIME_INTERVALL(t)  ∧  (STATE(e)  ∨  PROCESS(e))] 
 
Taking  into  account  the  points  mentioned  and  ignoring  the  contribution  of 
tense and other factors being irrelevant in this connection, I argue that the 
meaning of a sentence like (28) can be identified with a structure like (28’). 
 
(28)  Fred played the piano for one day.   
(28’)  ∃e [AG(fred, e)  ∧  play(e)  ∧  TH(the_piano, e)  ∧  for(e, 1_day)]   
 
According to (28’), the sentence conveys that Fred is the agent and a certain 
piano is the theme of a process which is a playing and lasts one day.  
Let me start my preliminary analysis of aspectual coercion with a closer 
look at sentence (1), repeated here as (29), where the selection restriction of 
the modifier for one day calls for an aspectual coercion of the VP play the 
sonata.  
  
(29)  #Fred played the sonata for one day.     
 
As  pointed  out  at  the  very  beginning,  the  sentence  is  not  interpreted  as 
referring to a single but to consecutive playing of one and the same sonata. 
Now,  after  some  features  of  eventuality  structure  have  been  explored,  it 
appears  that,  more  precisely,  (29)  refers  to  a  one-day  lasting  process  that 
consists of at least two temporally adjacent events of playing the sonata by 
Fred. In a somewhat simplified form, I represent the meaning of the sentence 
by the structure in (29’), where the formula behind the colon is a restriction of 
the ∀-quantifier. 
 
(29’)  ∃e [AG(fred, e)  ∧  ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)]  ∧  for(e, 1_day)] 
 
According to (29’), Fred is the agent of a process e and each event e’ being a 
constituent  of  e  is  a  playing  which  the  respective  sonata  participates  in  as 
theme. The core of this process-related interpretation is that the VP is coerced 
from a predicate of events into a predicate of processes that are constituted by  
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this kind of event. I illustrate the operation of iterative coercion (EVENT ⇒ 
PROCESS) in (30). 
 
(30)  play the sonata:  λe. play(e)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e) 
 
    λPλe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [P(e’)]  iterative coercion  
 
  play the sonata:  λe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)] 
 
Sentence  (2),  repeated  as  (31),  is  likewise  interpreted  in  a  process-related 
manner.  However,  as  previously  argued  with  respect  of  experiential 
knowledge, this interpretation does not result in an iterative but a subtractive 
reading.     
 
(31)  #Fred played the sonata for one minute.    
(31’)  ∃e [AG(fred, e)  ∧  ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)]  ∧  for(e, 1_minute)] 
 
As (31’) shows, Fred is again the agent of a process. But now, unlike sentence 
(29), the one-minute lasting process is characterized as an eventuality that can 
be completed to an event of playing the sonata.
16 This interpretation supposes 
that  play  the  sonata  is  changed  by  subtractive  coercion  (EVENT  ⇒ 
PROCESS)  from  a  predicate  of  events  to  a  predicate  of  processes,  the 
completion of which is such an event. 
 
(32)  play the sonata:  λe. play(e)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e) 
 
    λPλe. ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [P(e’)]  subtractive coercion  
         
  play the sonata:  λe. ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)] 
 
Consider next sentence (33).  
 
(33)  #Fred played the sonata for one year.      
 
                                                 
16   As noted in connection with the postulates in (21), the concept of process completion needs 
some  improvement.  In  order  to  avoid  the  imperfective  paradox,  provisorily,  I  use  the  ∃-
quantifier in a formula ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [… e’… e’…] without existential commitment, i.e. 
only in the sense of ‘for a possible … ’. As a consequence, using ∃ in the respective context 
does not presuppose the event at issue to exist in the actual world. For an elaborated approach 
to a problem of similar kind see Piñón (2008).  
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On the basis of experience, we know that human beings are unable to play a 
sonata  in  permanent  repetition  for  one  year.  For  this  reason,  contrary  to 
sentence  (29),  the  interpretation  of  (33)  cannot  work  in  terms  of  ordinary 
iteration. Instead, the sentence has to receive a habitual and,  with it, state-
related reading.  
 
(33’)  ∃e [HD(fred, e)  ∧  ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)]  ∧  for(e, 1_year)] 
 
Hence, the sentence refers to a one-year lasting state of Fred, which is realized 
by his playing a particular sonata from time to time. More precisely, Fred is 
the holder of a habitual state e such that each occurrence e’ being a realization 
of e is a playing of the respective sonata and e lasts one year.    
As  demonstrated  in  (34),  this  reading  is  based  on  a  habitual  coercion 
(OCCURRENCE  ⇒  HABITUAL_STATE)  by  means  of  which  the  VP  is 
shifted from a predicate of occurrences to a predicate of habitual states. 
 
(34)  play the sonata:  λe. play(e)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e) 
     
    λPλe. ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [P(e’)]  habitual coercion   
   
  play the sonata:  λe. ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)] 
 
Summing  up,  there  are  three  kinds  of  aspectual  coercion  which  episode 
predicates like play the sonata can be subject to under the influence of durative 
adverbials. Which of them is chosen for fitting the aspect of verbal expression 
is  dependent  on  the  concrete  content  of  the  adverbial  modifier  and  on  our 
experiential  knowledege  about  typical  duration  of  the  kind  of  eventualities 
involved. 
It  is  evident  that  the  same  is  true  of  change  predicates  like  run  to  the 
summit.  Thus,  sentences  comprising  such  a  verbal  predicate  in  conjunction 
with a durative adverbial can have an iterative or a subtractive and, hence, in 
each  case  process-related  reading  or  a  habitual,  state-related  reading. 
Importantly, however, for a sentence like (35) a change-related reading is also 
possible. 
 
(35)  #Rob ran to the summit for thirty minutes. 
 
The sentence can have an interpretation on which the adverbial specifies the 
duration of the state brought about by the running event. Thus, (35) conveys 
that Rob ran to the summit and the resulting state of his being at the summit 
lasted thirty minutes.   
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(35’)  ∃e [AG(rob, e)  ∧  run(e)  ∧  to(e, the_summit)  ∧  ∃e’: RES(e’, e) [for(e’, 30_minutes)]] 
 
Unlike the examples concerned with so far, this understanding requires the 
durative adverbial for thirty minutes to be shifted in its meaning in order to 
meet  the  condition  of  the  VP.  In  (36),  the  new  kind  of  transfer  operation 
underlying the structure in (35’) is represented.    
 
(36)  for thirty minutes:  λe. for(e, 30_minutes) 
     
    λPλe. ∃e’: RES(e’, e) [P(e’)]    ingressive coercion   
   
  for thirty minutes:  λe. ∃e’: RES(e’, e) [for(e’, 30_minutes)] 
 
The  derivation  shows  that  the  adverbial  undergoes  an  ingressive  coercion 
(STATE ⇒ CHANGE) by means of which it is shifted from a predicate of 
states to a predicate of changes resulting in such a state.
17 
Sentences containing a moment predicate as sneeze in combination with a 
durative adverbial also call for an iterative, subtractive or habitual coercion. 
However,  since  moments  are  eventualities  which  arise  from  an  episode  by 
ignoring its internal structure, initially another aspectual shift is demanded.  
For instance, we observe a clear preference for interpreting sentence (37) 
iteratively.  
 
(37)  #Liz sneezed for one hour.   
 
But  the  sentence  must  not  be  understood  as  simply  referring  to  repeated 
moments of sneezing by Liz. Such a treatment would ignore that a process can 
be only constituted by events. Rather, the moments of sneezing must be firstly 
‘stretched’  to  the  corresponding  episodes,  i.e.  they  are  traced  back  to  the 
eventualities the reduction of which they are. More precisely, before the verb 
can be subject to an iterative coercion (EVENT ⇒ PROCESS), it requires to 
undergo a stretching coercion (MOMENT ⇒ EPISODE). 
      
(38)  sneeze:  λe. sneeze(e) 
 
    λPλe. ∃e’: RED(e’, e) [P(e’)]    stretching coercion  
 
                                                 
17   Obviously,  interpretations  such  as  (35’)  suggest  that  the  traditional  concept  of  aspectual 
coercion should be extended. Not only verbal expressions but also adverbial modifiers can be 
subject to a meaning shift in order to avoid an aspectual mismatch.  
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  sneeze:  λe. ∃e’: RED(e’, e) [sneeze(e’)]   
 
    λPλe. ∀e’: CONST (e’, e) [P(e’)]  iterative coercion  
 
  sneeze:  λe. ∀e’: CONST (e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [sneeze(e’’)]] 
 
Since in derivation (38) two aspectual coercions are combined sentence (37) 
has the more complex meaning represented in (37’).  
 
(37’)  ∃e [TH(liz, e)  ∧  ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [sneeze(e’’)]]  ∧  for(e, 1_hour)] 
  
Here, Liz is the theme of a one-hour lasting process e such that for each event 
e’  being  a  constituent  of  e  there  is  a  moment  of  sneezing  e’’  which  is  a 
reduction of e’. 
In a similar way, sentence (39) and (40) are only acceptable on a reading 
where the moment predicate sneeze is at first changed to an episode predicate 
(stretching coercion) and then to a process predicate (subtractive coercion) or 
a state predicate (habitual coercion), respectively.      
 
(39)  #Liz sneezed for one second. 
(39’)  ∃e [TH(liz, e)  ∧  ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [sneeze(e’’)]]  ∧  for(e, 1_second)] 
 
(40)  #Liz sneezed for one month. 
(40’)  ∃e [HD(liz, e)  ∧  ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [sneeze(e’’)]]  ∧  for(e, 1_month)] 
 
To assign a meaning to sentences where a boundary predicate is coerced by a 
durative  adverbial  is  a  little  more  complicated.  Because  boundaries  are 
intrinsically  instantaneous,  no  stretching  is  possible  for  a  verb  like  win. 
Instead,  we  have  to  take  into  account  that  the  boundaries  forming  the 
denotation of it are culminations of corresponding events. For this reason, I 
propose that the meaning of sentence (41) can be identified with the structure 
given in (41’).      
 
(41)  #Chris won for three hours. 
(41’)  ∃e [AG(chris, e)  ∧  ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [∃e’’: CULM(e’’, e’) [win(e’’)]]  ∧  for(e, 3_hours)] 
 
Thus, Chris is the agent of a three-hours lasting process e such that for each 
event e’ being a constituent of e there is a winning e’’ which is the culmination 
of e’. As a precondition, win must undergo a twofold aspectual shift: first, a 
new operation, namely an additive coercion (BOUNDARY ⇒ EVENT) and, 
second, an iterative coercion (EVENT ⇒ PROCESS).         
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(42)  win:  λe. win(e) 
 
    λPλe. ∃e’: CULM(e’, e) [P(e’)]  additive coercion 
 
  win:  λe. ∃e’: CULM(e’, e) [win(e’)]  
 
    λPλe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [P(e’)]  iterative coercion 
 
  win:  λe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [∃e’’: CULM(e’’, e’) [win(e’’)]] 
 
Analogous to (41), the interpretation of sentence (43) involves two shifting 
operations.  At  first,  the  verb  is  likewise  subject  to  an  additive  coercion 
(BOUNDARY  ⇒  EVENT).  After  this,  however,  a  habitual  coercion 
(OCCURRENCE ⇒ HABITUAL_STATE) has to take place.   
 
(43)  #Chris won for three months.   
(43’)  ∃e [HD(chris, e)  ∧  ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [∃e’’: CULM(e’’, e’) [win(e’’)]]  ∧  for(e, 3_months)]
         
Consequently, (43) refers to a habitual state of Chris,  which is realized by 
events that culminate in a winning and lasts three months.  
As opposed to (41) and (43), a sentence like (44) has no reading.  
 
(44)  *Chris won for three seconds.   
 
For  interpreting  the  sentence,  also  two  shifting  operations  –  this  time,  an 
additive and a subtractive coercion – would be needed. But this means that, 
firstly,  boundaries  would  have  to  be  ‘supplemented’  to  events  which, 
subsequently, would have to be ‘cut down’ on processes. It seems that such a 
combination of operations is odd for pragmatic reasons.
18  
 
3.2 Coercion by time-span adverbials 
 
Let me now turn to the analysis of sentences where the VP is coerced by a 
time-span  adverbial.  Basis  of  this  kind  of  aspectual  coercion  is  the  sortal 
restriction given by the postulate in (45).   
                                                 
18   In contrast, a sentence as #Chris left for three seconds has an interpretation according to which 
Chris left and this leaving was the beginning of a three-seconds lasting state of his being away. 
Probably, this is explained by the fact that, unlike win, the boundary predicate leave does not 
denote culminations of change. In any case, analogous to sentence (35) in its change-related 
reading (35’), not the verb but the adverbial modifier has to be coerced here.              
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(45)  ∀e∀t [in(e, t)  →  TIME_INTERVALL(t)  ∧  EVENT(e)] 
 
As indicated, time-span adverbials can only be applied to predicates of events, 
i.e. episodes or changes.  
To begin with, consider sentence (46) that again contains the VP sneeze 
which is originally a moment predicate.  
 
(46)  #Liz sneezed in two seconds. 
 
A possible reading of the sentence is that Liz was the theme of an episode such 
that its reduction is a moment of sneezing and the time intervall during which 
it takes place is two seconds.
19 
 
(46’)  ∃e [TH(liz, e)  ∧  ∃e’: RED(e’, e’) [sneeze(e’)]]  ∧  in(e, 2_seconds)] 
 
Clearly, to obtain the meaning represented in (46’), the verb sneeze must be 
subject to a stretching coercion (MOMENT ⇒ EPISODE).  
     Also achievements which appear in conjunction with a time-span adverbial 
are  available  for  aspectual  coercion.  For  instance,  sentence  (47)  can  be 
interpreted as meaning that Sam was the agent or the theme of an event which 
within ten minutes culminated by his reaching the summit.  
 
(47)  #Sam reached the summit in ten minutes. 
(47’)  ∃e [AG/TH(sam, e)  ∧  ∃e’: CULM(e’, e) [reach(e‘)  ∧  TH(the_summit, e’)]   
  ∧  in(e, 10_minutes)] 
 
This interpretation supposes that the VP reach the summit is transformed by 
additive coercion from a boundary predicate into an event predicate.  
Another operation of aspectual coercion can be performed if a time-span 
adverbial occurres in combination with a stative VP. I suggest that a sentence 
as (48) has a possible reading on which it does not refer to a state but to a 
change. 
 
(48)  #Sam was at the summit in ten minutes.  
                                                 
19   It should be noted that the kinds of sentence discussed in this section generally have a further 
reading which is often more salient. On this interpretation, a time-span adverbial measures a 
contextually determined intervall at the end of which the respective eventuality takes place. 
Thus, while the VP is used in its literal meaning, the in-adverbial is understood as being 
synonym with the corresponding after-adverbial. If it is placed in front of the sentence, only 
this interpretation is available. 
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(48’)  ∃e [AG/TH(sam, e)  ∧  ∃e’: RES(e’, e) [be_at_the_summit(e’)]  ∧  in(e, 10_minutes)] 
 
According to (48’), Sam is characterized as the agent or the theme of a change 
that takes ten minutes and results in his being at the summit. As a precondition, 
the VP be at the summit must be shifted by ingressive coercion – which has 
been carried out already in case of sentence (35) although there at the adverbial 
– from a predicate of states to a predicate of changes.  
Interestingly,  the  kinds  of  coercion  concerned  with  are  not  confined  to 
modification  by  time-span  adverbials.  In  particular,  some  manner  adverbs, 
among them quickly, slowly, suddenly and gradually, can also trigger a shift of 
aspect.  For  instance,  the  VPs  occurring  in  sentence  (49a)  and  (49b)  are 
compatible with quickly on condition that they are subject to an additive or an 
ingressive coercion, respectively.  
 
(49)  (a)  #Sam quickly reached the summit.  
  (b)  #Sam quickly was at the summit. 
 
Accordingly,  analogous  to  (47)  and  (48),  the  sentences  are  interpreted  as 
meaning that Sam participated in a quick event that culminated by his reaching 
the summit or resulted in his being there, respectively.
20  
Finally, look at sentence (50) where run being originally a process predicate 
occurres in combination with a time-span adverbial. A possible understanding 
is that the sentence describes how long it took for Julia to do a complete run.   
 
(50)  #Julia ran in ten minutes. 
 
Such  an  interpretation  is  justified  only  in  contexts  from  which  a  suitable 
culmination can be drawn − in (50), for instance, by  way of identifying a 
certain running distance. Given this assumption, the meaning of the sentence 
can be represented as follows:/ 
 
(50’)  ∃e [AG(julia, e)   ∧  ∃e’: SUBST(e’, e) [run(e’)]  ∧  in(e, 10_minutes] 
 
Here, Julia is the agent of a ten-minutes lasting event, the substratum of which 
is  a  process  of  running.  Obviously,  a  new  kind  of  aspectual  coercion  is 
necessary in order to adapt the aspect of run.  
 
                                                 
20   Sentences as (49a) and (49b) can likewise have an interpretation on which the VP is used in its 
literal meaning. Then, their reading is that a short periode of time elapses before the respective 
boundary or state is in existence. 
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(51)   run:  λe. run(e) 
     
    λPλe. ∃e’: SUBST(e’, e) [P(e’)]  completive coercion     
 
  run:  λe. ∃e’: SUBST(e’, e) [run(e’)] 
 
As indicated by (51), the VP is shifted by completive coercion (PROCESS ⇒ 
EVENT) from a process predicate to an event predicate.  
Finally, it has also to be taken into account that temporal adverbials often 
occur together. For instance, in sentence (52), at first the VP win the game 
combines with the time-span adverbial in five minutes, and then the VP win the 
game in five minutes combines with the durative adverbial for five months.  
 
(52)  #Mary won the game in five minutes for five months. 
(52’)  ∃e [HD(mary, e)  ∧  ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [∃e’’: CULM(e’’, e’) [win(e’’)  ∧  TH(the_game, e’’)]  
  ∧  in(e’, 5_minutes)]  ∧  for(e, 5_months)] 
 
It follows that the interpretation of (52) involves two shifting operations: First, 
win the game is transformed by additive coercion from a boundary predicate 
into  an  event  predicate  and,  second,  win  the  game  in  five  minutes  is 
transformed  by  habitual  coercion  from  an  occurrence  predicate  into  a 
predicate of habitual states.          
 
3.3 Coercion by time-point adverbials 
 
According to the postulate in (53), time-point adverbials like at seven o’clock 
sharp are restricted to predicates of boundaries, moments or states. 
 
(53)  ∀et [at(e, t)  →  TIME_POINT(t)  ∧  (POINT(e)  ∨  STATE(e))] 
 
Thus, to meet the aspectual constraint of this kind of adverbial modifier, a VP 
denoting actually a property of occurrences, i.e. processes or events, has to be 
coerced. 
For instance, look at sentence (54) and (55).       
 
(54)  #Julia ran at seven o’clock sharp. 
(55)  #Julia ran to the summit at seven o’clock sharp. 
 
The sentences are most naturally interpreted as referring to a boundary that is 
the  beginning  of  a  process  of  Julia’s  running  and  a  boundary  that  is  the 
beginning  of  an  event  of  her  running  to  a  certain  summit,  respectively.  
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Correspondingly, I assume that the meaning of (54) and (55) can be identified 
with the structure in (54’) and in (55’), respectively, where BEG−
1 – read as is 
begun by – is the inverse relation of BEG.         
 
(54’)  ∃e [TH(julia, e)  ∧  ∃e’: BEG−
1(e’, e) [run(e’)]  ∧  at(e, 7_o’clock)] 
(55’)  ∃e [TH(julia, e)  ∧  ∃e’: BEG−
1(e’, e) [run(e’)  ∧  to(the_summit, e’)]  ∧  at(e, 7_o’clock)] 
 
As a precondition, the two VPs must undergo a new kind of aspectual coercion 
– an inchoative coercion (OCCURRENCE ⇒ BOUNDARY) – which shifts a 
predicate of occurrences to a predicate of boundaries which are the beginning 
of such an occurrence. In (56), the operation underlying the boundary-related 
interpretation of (54) is represented.  
 
(56)   run:  λe. run(e) 
     
    λPλe. ∃e’: BEG−
1(e’, e) [P(e’)]  inchoative coercion  
     
  run:  λe. ∃e’: BEG−
1(e’, e) [run(e’)] 
 
Something analogous is true for the interpretation of sentence (55).  
 
3.4 Coercion by the progressive 
 
Till  now,  I  have  examined  aspectual  coercions  by  temporal  modifiers.  As 
demonstrated,  this  kind  of  operation  is  an  implicit,  contextually  governed 
transition  that  comes  into  play  whenever  there  is  an  impending  conflict 
between  the  aspect  of  the  VP  and  the  aspectual  constraint  of  the  temporal 
adverbial. In addition, however, there are also aspectual operations which are 
explicitly encoded in language and, therefore, syntactically or morphologically 
visible. This section extends my examination, first, to such explicit transitions 
and, second, to aspectual coercions which have often to be performed in order 
to make the former possible in the first place.  
One of the aspectual shifts having a counterpart in linguistic form is the 
progressive  in  English.  Parsons  (1990)  observes  that  progressive  sentences 
refer to a particular kind of state: For every event that is ever in progress, there 
is an uniquely associated state, the ‘in-progress’ state of the event, which holds 
as long as the event is in progress. In the literature, there is a dispute about the 
question  of  what  eventualities  can  have  such  a  progressive  state.  While 
Parsons (1990) supposes that event predicates can be subject of the progressive 
operator, authors like Moens and Steedman (1988) or Pulman (1997) suggest 
that it is only applicable to process predicates. Following the proposal by de  
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Swart  (1998)  and  Egg  (2005),  I  argue  that  the  domain  of  the  progressive 
operator  is  constituted  by  the  predicates  of  occurrences,  i.e.  events  or 
processes.  It  helps  to  explain  why  sentences  like  (4b)  as  well  as  (6b)  are 
acceptable  without  restriction,  but  sentences  like  (5b),  (7b)  or  (15b)  not. 
Additionally, for the sake of simplicity, I assume that progressive states can be 
subsumed under episodic states.  
Consequently,  the  progressive  operator  PROG  (OCCURRENCE  ⇒ 
EPISODIC_STATE), which has the linguistic marker be –ing, is regarded as a 
tool for shifting occurrence predicates into predicates of episodic states. It can 
be identified with the structure in (57a), where IN_PROG denotes the relation 
the being in progress of which meets the postulate in (57b).
21 
 
(57)  (a)  λPλe. ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [P(e’)] 
  (b)  ∀ee’ [IN_PROG(e, e’)  →  EPISODIC_STATE(e)  ∧  OCCURRENCE(e’)] 
 
For illustrating, consider sentence (58) and (59). 
 
(58)  Julia was running. 
(59)  Julia was running to the summit. 
 
Since  run  and  run  to  the  summit  are  predicates  of  processes  and  events, 
respectively, PROG is immediately applicable to them. Therefore, the meaning 
of the progressive of run can be derived as follows:   
 
(60)   run:  λe. run(e) 
     
    be -ing:  λPλe. ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [P(e’)]  PROG  
     
  be running:  λe. ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [run(e’)] 
 
Accordingly, the meaning of (58) is represented as in (58’).  
 
(58’)  ∃e [HD(julia, e)  ∧  ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [run(e’)]] 
 
                                                 
21   As pointed out by Dowty (1979) and many others, the progressive operator actually requires an 
intensional analysis. Accordingly, the progressive picks out a stage of the occurrence which, if 
it does not continue in the actual world, has a reasonable chance of continuing in some other 
possible world which resembles the actual world in certain ways. This intensionality is not 
taken into account here. In order to avoid the imperfective paradox, again provisorily, I use the 
∃-quantifier in PROG without existential commitment  (cf. footnote 16).  
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As indicated, Julia is the holder of a state that is the being in progress of a 
process of running. Analogous is true for sentence (59). 
By contrast, sentence (61) requires an aspectual coercion because the verb is 
originally a moment predicate.     
 
(61)  #Liz was sneezing. 
 
The sentence means most naturally either that Liz is in an in-progress state of 
single sneezing (cf. (61a)) or that Liz is in an in-progress state of iterative 
sneezing (cf. (61b)).  
 
(61)  (a)  #Liz was sneezing (for one second). 
  (b)  #Liz was sneezing (for one hour). 
 
It appears that the interpretation of (61) fails unless sneeze is changed to an 
episode predicate by stretching coercion (MOMENT ⇒ EPISODE) or to a 
process predicate by, firstly, stretching coercion and, subsequently, iterative 
coercion (EVENT ⇒ PROCESS). As a result, the two readings of (61) are 
represented as follows: 
 
(61’)  (a)  ∃e [HD(liz, e)  ∧  ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [sneeze(e’’)]]] 
  (b)  ∃e [HD(liz, e)  ∧  ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [∀e’’: CONST(e’’, e’) [∃e’’’: RED(e’’’, e’’)    
    [sneeze(e’’’)]]]] 
 
In a similar way, sentence (62) can be interpreted as meaning that Chris is in 
an in-progress state of single winning or that Chris is in an in-progress state of 
iterative winning.      
 
(62)   #Chris was winning. 
(62’)  (a)  ∃e [HD(chris, e)  ∧  ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [∃e’’: CULM(e’’, e’) [win(e’’)]]] 
  (b)  ∃e [HD(chris, e)  ∧  ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [∀e’’: CONST(e’’, e’)  
    [∃e’’’: CULM(e’’’, e’’) [win(e’’’)]]]] 
 
Accordingly, in order to satisfy the sortal restriction of the progressive, the 
interpretation of (62) calls for one of two possible transitions of win: its only 
additive  coercion  (BOUNDARY  ⇒  EVENT)  or  its  additive  coercion  and 
subsequent iterative coercion (EVENT ⇒ PROCESS). 
It  is  well-known  that  the  progressive  does  not  normally  combine  with 
stative verbal expressions. At the same time, however, there is also a certain 
tendency to accept such a combination for expressions of habitual states in  
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appropriate contexts. For instance, special assumptions are required to make 
sense of sentence (63).  
 
(63)  #Paul was being clever (in selling the car). 
 
I assume that stative expressions like be clever have to be shifted to occurrence 
predicates before the progressive operator can be applied. The new operation 
of  agentive  coercion  (HABITUAL_STATE  ⇒  OCCURRENCE),  which  is 
required here, is illustrated in (64), where REAL−
1 – read as is realized by – is 
the inverse relation of REAL.  
 
(64)   be clever:  λe. be_clever(e) 
     
    λPλe. ∃e’: REAL−
1(e’, e) [P(e’)]  agentive coercion 
       
  be clever:  λe. ∃e’: REAL−
1(e’, e) [be_clever(e’)] 
 
Accordingly, the meaning of (63) can be identified with the structure given in 
(63’). 
 
(63’)  ∃e [HD(eve, e)  ∧  ∃e’: IN_PROG(e, e’) [∃e’’: REAL−
1(e’’, e’) [be_clever(e’’)]]] 
 
Sentence (63) refers to a state of Eve, which is the being in progress of an 
occurrence that realizes her habitual state of being clever.  
 
3.5 A two-stage approach: Aspectual coercion as pragmatic enrichment 
 
To take stock, I have distinguished a multitude of operations for transforming 
the  aspect  and,  thus,  the  meaning  of  expressions  denoting  properties  of 
eventualities. My analysis until now is summarized in figure 3. The picture 
indicates a network of aspects and possible transitions between them.  
 
                EVENTUALITY 
                                                                    
     
     POINT                 HAPPENING  
 
 
BOUNDARY  MOMENT         STATE                               OCCURRENCE 
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               HABITUAL   EPISODIC     PROCESS        EVENT 
                   STATE             STATE 
                                   
                                                      PROG            EPISODE       CHANGE 
                               
                                                                 agentive coercion 
           
        inchoative coercion                   
               
                           iterative coercion 
                                                          
                                               completive coercion 
 
                         subtractive coercion 
                             
            ingressive coercion 
 
            habitual coercion 
 
                 stretching coercion 
 
            additive coercion 
 
Figure 3 
 
In (65), all kinds of aspectual coercion that have been subject of consideration 
in  the  last  four  sections,  along  with  the  operators  that  underlie  them,  are 
listed.
22         
 
(65)  (a)  iterative coercion (EVENT ⇒ PROCESS): 
    λPλe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
  (b)  subtractive coercion (EVENT ⇒ PROCESS): 
    λPλe. ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
  (c)  completive coercion (PROCESS ⇒ EVENT): 
    λPλe. ∃e’: SUBST(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
  (d)  inchoative coercion (OCCURRENCE ⇒ BOUNDARY): 
    λPλe. ∃e’: BEG−
1(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
  (e)  habitual coercion (OCCURRENCE ⇒ HABITUAL_STATE): 
    λPλe. ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
                                                 
22   As demonstrated in Dölling (1995, 1997), in the domain of object-denoting expressions there is 
an analogous network of sortal predicates and possible transitions between them.   
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  (f)  agentive coercion (HABITUAL_STATE ⇒ OCCURRENCE):    
    λPλe. ∃e’: REAL−
1(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
  (g)  additive coercion (BOUNDARY ⇒ EVENT): 
    λPλe. ∃e’: CULM(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
  (h)  stretching coercion (MOMENT ⇒ EPISODE) 
    λPλe. ∃e’: RED(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
  (i)  ingressive coercion (STATE ⇒ CHANGE): 
    λPλe. ∃e’: RES(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
 
In  this  section,  I  will  offer  an  approach  that  focusses  on  the  systematic 
character of the operators of aspectual coercion and their application.  
Researchers like Pustejovsky (1995), Jackendoff (1997), de Swart (1998) or 
Rothstein (2004) assume that coercion operators are inserted into the meaning 
structure when it is required by the process of semantic composition. More 
precisely, the insertion is triggered by an actual mismatch between the aspect 
of  verbal  expressions  and  the  aspectual  constraint  of  their  modifier.  In  the 
absence of such a conflict no coercion operator appears. Further, the authors 
formulate  rules  that  check  the  input  conditions  for  temporal  adverbials  or 
explicit aspectul operators like the progressive, and that introduce a (more or 
less) special coercion operator to be applied to the verbal expression if the 
aspectual constraints are not met.  
But this kind of approach has at least two shortcomings. First, it disregards 
that aspectual coercion needs not emerge from a sentence-internal source. In 
particular, as already exemplified by means of sentence (3), the requirement of 
adjustment  may  also  result  from  a  conflict  with  stereotypical  experience. 
Second, it leaves out of consideration that to prevent an aspectual conflict does 
not always mean that the verbal expression has to be coerced. For instance, as 
we have observed above, a sentence like (35) also provides the opportunity to 
adjust the adverbial modifier. Therefore, in each case, we have to decide which 
of the involved expressions is subject to coercion and which of the possible 
coercion  operators  is  used.  Such  decisions,  however,  require  additional 
information to be taken into account. Consequently, both types of example 
show that an appropriate coercion operator cannot be inserted unless extra-
linguistic knowledge is consulted.      
By contrast, my final account of aspectual coercion is not only more general 
but also fully compatible with the principle of semantic compositionality.
23 It 
rests  on  the  basic  assumption  that  only  a  part  of  an  utterance  meaning  is 
linguistically determined. This strongly underspecified meaning is represented 
                                                 
23   To what follows, see Dölling (2003a, 2003b, 2005a) and Dölling and Heyde-Zybatow (2007) 
for further discussion. Cf. also Dölling (1995, 1997) for my proposals to handle systematic 
shifts of nominal predicates in a similar manner.    
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by  a  structure  which  I  call  Semantic  Form  (SF).  Because  SFs  model  the 
context-independent  meaning  of  expressions  they  are  composed  strictly 
compositionally.  At  the  same  time,  SFs  comprise  parameters,  i.e.  free 
variables, which indicate where particular constants of the respective type are 
to be inserted into the linguistically determined meaning. This instantiation of 
parameters and, thereby, specification of meaning by taking recourse to world 
knowledge is the task of pragmatics. It is carried out in terms of pragmatic 
inferences, for instance, abductive ones (cf. e.g. Hobbs et al. 1993, Dölling 
1997). When the SF parameters are instantiated, a Parameter-Fixed Structure 
(PFS) for the meaning of expression arises. In sum, this two-stage approach 
considers  that  grasping  the  full  meaning  of  an  utterance  always  includes 
pragmatic enrichments of its SF in the course of interpretation.      
As noted previously, I pursue a strategy that is largely analogous to that by 
Pulman (1997) and Egg (2005). Both authors suppose that semantic structure 
of expressions does not contain any coercion operator. Instead, they propose 
that semantic construction introduces particular gaps or blanks which buffer 
potential  aspectual  conflicts  and  into  which  relevant  operators  (or  a 
combination of them) can be inserted if required. Thus, anticipating possible 
aspectual coercions, the positions are 'prophylactically' included into semantic 
structure. If any aspectual incompatibility impends the respective position is 
filled; if not it is deleted. Due to the fact that Pulman and Egg distinguish 
between underspecified semantics of coercion and its potential instantiation, I 
agree  with  their  basic  idea.  In  respect  to  the  restrictions  they  impose  on 
instantiation, however, I object that the proposals are too coarse-grained.       
In order to clarify this, let me take a closer look at the list given in (65). It is 
obvious  that  operators  of  aspectual  coercion  change  only  the  aspect  of 
expressions,  but  not  their  logical  (or  semantic)  type.  Accordingly,  each 
operator denotes a mapping from properties of eventualities of a certain sort 
onto properties of eventualities of some other sort. More precisely, properties P 
are mapped onto properties λe. Qe’: R(e’, e) [P(e’)] where some quantifier Q 
ranging over e’ has as its restriction an intersortal relation R between e’ and e, 
and its scope is the proposition that e’ is P.  
Since all operators in (65) have the same formal structure, my proposal is to 
repesent them by a template called coerce.
24  
 
(66)  λPλe. Q e’: R(e’, e) [P(e’)] 
 
                                                 
24   The term coerce is borrowed from Pulman (1997). In former papers, I designated templates of 
similar kind sort, met, infl or var. Cf. also Nunberg (1995) for his assumption of two general 
operators of predicate transfer.   
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I  regard  coerce  as  an  abstract  coercion  operator  which  under  definite 
conditions  is  introduced  into  SF  composition.
25  The  symbols  Q  and  R  are 
parameters  that  can  be  instantiated  by  quantifiers  like  ∃  or  ∀  and  general 
relations between eventualities like =, CONST, COMPL, SUBST or REAL, 
respectively. As mentioned above, this fixation of the parameters is left to the 
interpretation  of  SF  dependently  from  context.  As  a  consequence,  coerce 
leaves room for different specifications at PFS. In particular, on demand it can 
be specified to one of the concrete coercion operators in (65).      
For illustrating the use of coerce, consider the VP play the sonata. Before in 
semantic construction it may be combined with others expressions the operator 
coerce has to be applied to its SF first.    
 
(67)  play the sonata:  λe. play(e)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e) 
 
    coerce:  λPλe. Q e’: R(e’, e) [P(e’)]    
 
  play the sonata:  λe. Q e’: R(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)] 
 
The SF arising from this operation is more complex and, in particular, contains 
the parameters Q and R. If in the course of interpretation values are assigned to 
them we obtain a PFS that represents one of the possible readings of the VP. 
For instance, an universal instantiation of Q and a fixation of R as the relation 
CONST  specifies  coerce  to  the  operator  of  iterative  coercion. 
Correspondingly,  play  the  sonata  receives  an  iterative  interpretation  and, 
therefore, denotes a property of processes. 
 
(68)  λe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)] 
 
In  case  no  aspectual  coercion  is  needed,  a  default  fixation  of  coerce  is 
available, namely, existential instantiation of Q and regarding R as the identity 
relation. As the logical relation in (69) shows, this interpretation is equivalent 
to removing the operator. 
 
(69)  λe. ∃e’: e’= e [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’)]  
  ≡  λe. play(e)  ∧  TH(the_sonata, e’) 
 
Accordingly, the VP is used in its default and, thus, literal meaning, i.e. it is a 
predicate of episodes.   
                                                 
25   I suppose that each SF being a one-place predicate of eventualities is subject to an application 
of coerce (cf. Dölling 1997, 2003a, 2003b).   
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After  this  general  characterization,  I  will  sketch  how  the  two  above-
mentioned problem cases are handled in my approach. First, a sentence like 
(3), repeated here as (70),  has an SF which can be identified with the highly 
simplified structure in (70’).   
    
(70)  #Fred played the piano for one year. 
(70’)  ∃e [AG(fred, e)  ∧  Q e’: R(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_piano, e’)]  ∧  for(e, 1_year)] 
 
Taking  into  account  our  experiential  knowledge  about  typical  duration  of 
playing a piano without break, from the SF in (70’) we can derive the PFS in 
(70
+), representing the habitual reading of (70).  
   
(70
+)  ∃e [AG(fred, e)  ∧  ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [play(e’)  ∧  TH(the_piano, e’)]  ∧  for(e, 1_year)] 
 
Here, the parameters Q and R are instantiated by ∀ and REAL, respectively. 
Second,  a  sentence  like  (35)  or  even  like  (71)  needs  some  more 
considerations. 
 
(71)  #Rob ran to the summit for some time. 
 
In (71), coercion is due to the restricted aspectual compatibility of the VP run 
to the summit and the durative adverbial for some time. A closer look at run to 
the  summit  for  some  time  reveals  that  it  has  at  least  four  possible 
interpretations, namely an iterative, a subtractive and a habitual reading as well 
as a reading on which the adverbial specifies the duration of the poststate. 
Accordingly, to derive these readings demands that the SFs of both the VP and 
the adverbial are subject of coerce. After the two applications of the operator, 
we obtain the SFs in (72).   
 
(72)  (a)  λe. Q1 e’: R1(e’, e) [run(e’)  ∧  to(e’, the_summit)] 
  (b)  λe. Q2 e’: R2(e’, e) [for(e’, some_time)]   
 
Modifying the VP by the adverbial then yields the more complex SF for run to 
the summit for some time in (73).  
 
(73)  λe. Q1 e’: R1(e’, e) [run(e’)  ∧  to(e’, the_summit)]  ∧  Q2 e’: R2(e’, e) [for(e’’, some_time)] 
 
From this SF we can now derive the PFSs for the four readings.  
 
(73’)  (a)  λe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [run(e’)  ∧  to(e’, the_summit)]  ∧  for(e, some_time)   
  (b)  λe. ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [run(e’)  ∧  to(e’, the_summit)]  ∧  for(e, some_time)     
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  (c)  λe. ∃e’: REAL(e’, e) [run(e’)  ∧  to(e’, the_summit)]  ∧  for(e, some_time)    
  (d)  λe. run(e)  ∧  to(e’, the_summit)  ∧  ∃e’: RES(e’, e) [for(e’, some_time)]     
 
For instance, the PFS for the iterative reading of (73), which is given in (73’a), 
emerges  again  by  universal  instantiation  of  Q1  and  interpretation  of  R1  as 
CONST, while the second instance of coerce gets default fixation. In constrast 
to that, the PFS for the poststate reading  is (73’d). Here, the first instance of 
coerce gets default fixation, Q2 is interpreted existentially, and R2, as RES.  
Till now, it has been remained unconsidered that coercion can be iterated. 
An examination of sentences like (37), (39), (40), (41) or (43) shows that this 
kind of aspectual adjustment could be explained as resulting on the basis of a 
twofold  application  of  coerce.  However,  the  procedure  would  raise  the 
question of how the repeated use of the operator can be restricted to at most 
twice.  Therefore,  I  suggest  that  an  improvement  or,  more  precisely,  a 
generalization of coerce is necessary.  
The new abstract operator coerce* given in (74) is derived by functional 
composition  of  two  instances  of  coerce.  Its  more  complex  character  is 
accounted for by the embedding of a second restricted quantifier in the scope 
of the first one. 
 
(74)  λPλe. Q
1e’: R
1(e’, e) [Q
2e’’: R
2(e’’, e’) [P(e’’)]] 
 
Possible  concrete  coercion  operators,  which  at  PFS  arise  from  coerce*  by 
instantiating its parameters Q
1, Q
2, R
1 and R
2 appropriately, are listed in (75).   
 
(75)  (a)  iterative-stretching coercion (MOMENT ⇒ PROCESS): 
    λPλe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [P(e’’)]]   
  (b)  subtractive-stretching coercion (MOMENT ⇒ PROCESS): 
    λPλe. ∃e’: COMPL(e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [P(e’’)]] 
  (c)  habitual-stretching coercion (MOMENT ⇒ HABITUAL_STATE): 
    λPλe. ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [P(e’’)]] 
  (d)  iterative-additive coercion (BOUNDARY ⇒ PROCESS): 
    λPλe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [∃e’’: CULM(e’’, e’) [P(e’’)]] 
  (e)  habitual-additive coercion (BOUNDARY ⇒ HABITUAL_STATE):   
    λPλe. ∀e’: REAL(e’, e) [∃e’’: CULM(e’’, e’) [P(e’’)]]     
 
For instance, applying coerce* to the SF of sneeze delivers the structure in 
(76).  
 
(76)  λe. Q
1e’: R
1(e’, e) [Q
2e’’: R
2(e’’, e’) [sneeze(e’’)]] 
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From this SF the PFSs for the several readings of sneeze can be derived. As an 
example, the meaning of sneeze being part of a VP like sneeze for one hour 
(cf.  sentence  (37))  is  the  result  of  its  iterative-stretching  coercion. 
Accordingly, we obtain the PFS in (77). 
 
(77)  λe. ∀e’: CONST(e’, e) [∃e’’: RED(e’’, e’) [sneeze(e’’)]] 
 
Here, Q
1 has been instantiated as the quantifier ∀, R
1 as the relation CONST, 
Q
2 as the quantifier ∃, and R
2 as the relation RED.  
It  is  easy  to  demonstrate  that  the  concrete  coercion  operators  observed 
previously are also possible specifications of coerce*. That is, any  kind of 
adjustment treated with coerce so far can be viewed as being actually based on 
the  more  general  operator.  Moreover,  my  assumption  is  that  there  is  no 
aspectual coercion which is not performed by means of coerce*.   
Finally, it should be noted that during the last ten years a lot of work in 
psycho-  and  neurolinguistics  was  devoted  to  aspectual  coercion  (see  e.g. 
Piñango  et  al.  2006,  Pylkkänen  and  McElree  2006,  Pickering  et  al.  2006, 
Brennan and Pylkkänen 2008, Pylkkänen 2008, Bott 2010).
26 But up to the 
present,  only  a  very  small  subset  of  kinds  of  coercion  were  subject  of 
experiments. The investigations concentrated primarily on iterative readings, 
and the shifting operations most often experimentally tested were adjustments 
of semelfactives like sneeze or jump. Psycholinguistic research yielded mixed 
findings on the question whether aspectual coercion is cognitively demanding 
or not: while some studies found sentences such as (78) to take longer to read 
than  sentences  involving  no  aspectual  mismatch  (e.g.  Piñango  et  al.  2006, 
Brennan  and  Pylkkänen  2008),  others  failed  to  find  any  such  processing 
consequences (e.g. Pickering et al. 2006).  
 
(78)  #For ten minutes, Susan jumped. 
 
Thus, it seems to be delivered no definite judgment on the basis of current 
experimental results. 
Importantly, however, the MEG studies by Brennan and Pylkkänen (2008) 
provide some empirical evidence that the two-stage approach pursued in this 
paper could be on the right  track. In searching for neural correlates of the 
processing  cost  elicited  by  aspectual  mismatch  resolution  in  sentences  like 
(78), the authors identified two distinct effects, an earlier right-lateral frontal, 
anterior temporal and posterior temporal/cerebellar effect at 340–380 ms after 
verb onset, and a later anterior midline effect at 440–460 ms. They suggest that 
                                                 
26   For a general review see, in particular, Pylkkänen (2008) and Bott (2010).  
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of the representational hypotheses currently in the literature, the data are most 
consistent with the assumption of a pragmatic realization of iterative coercion, 
which is argued for in Dölling (2003a, 2003b). Whereas the first effect can be 
interpreted as reflecting an detection of anomaly of the sentence in its default, 
literal reading, the second one can be associated with a meaning shift of the 
verb.   
 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been explaining the system of aspectual coercion. 
For  this  purpose,  I  have  addressed  the  question  of  how  the  aspect  of 
expressions and its contexually determined shifting are based on eventuality 
structure. In the first part of my account, some assumptions standardly made 
about aspectual classes and their correlation to sorts of eventuality have been 
examined.  As  has  been  demonstrated,  there  is  a  lot  of  indications  that  the 
domain  of  eventualities  referred  to  by  expressions  is  more  structured  than 
commonly supposed. More precisely, I have argued for a richer differentiation 
of eventualities into sorts and a number of general relations between members 
of  them.  In  the  second  part,  a  multitude  of  operations  for  systematically 
transforming the aspect of expressions have been analyzed. Crucially, it has 
appeared that the different kinds of aspectual coercion have basically the same 
structure. In particular, shifting an expression from the one sortal predicate to 
another  one  always  involves  a  reference  to  a  general  relation  that  exists 
between eventualities of the respective sorts. Taking this into consideration, I 
have proposed an approach to aspectual coercion, which makes a distinction 
between two stages of calculation of meaning. Whereas in the first stage an 
abstract, underspecified coercion operator is mandatorily inserted in semantic 
composition,  in  the  second  one  if  required  an  aspectual  coercion  can  be 
realized by pragmatically enriching it.  
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